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Lakatos' Philosophy of Mathematics: A Historical Approach. By Teun Koetsier. 
Studies in the History and Philosophy of Mathematics. Volume 3. Amsterdam 
(North-Holland, Elsevier). 1991. 312 pages, including bibliography and index. 
Reviewed by JOHN SHOSKY 
Department of Philosophy and Religion, The American University, Washington, DC 20016 
Imre Lakatos' sudden death in 1974 prematurely ended the philosophical contri- 
butions of one of the most underappreciated, yetwidely influential, philosophers 
of the 20th century. Many scholars remember his challenging contribution found 
in the Schilpp two-volume Library of Living Philosophers series on Popper (Open 
Court, 1974), whom Lakatos evidently admired enormously. Others may know him 
from the posthumous Proofs and Refutations: The Logic of Mathematical Discovery, 
excellently edited by Worrall and Zahar (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1976). Those with 
a more determined interest may also be familiar with the two-volume set of Lakatos' 
papers, edited by Worrall and Currie, published as The Methodology of Scientific 
Research Programs and Mathematics, Science and Epistemology (Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 1978). 
Teun Koetsier's Lakatos' Philosophy of Mathematics is a worthy addition to the 
Lakatos literature, an exploration of "quasi-empiricism" and other issues in the 
methodology of mathematics. Lakatos courageously explored the nature of proof 
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theory in mathematics, a less than popular inquiry in many quarters. This required 
a careful examination of mathematical theory, methodology, confirmation, discon- 
firmation, and universalization of mathematical results. Lakatos found fault with 
those who believe that the foundations of mathematics transcend emonstrat ion- -  
correctly elucidating that the beginning point in mathematics, as in science, must 
begin with a leap of faith. But Lakatos was also correct to argue that not all leaps 
of faith are equally barren of justification, and that some first principles or starting 
points are more justified than others, even if no level of justification reaches cer- 
tainty. An important part of this argument is Lakatos' claim that mathematics i  
not Euclidean, with truth flowing downward from the axioms at the top to the 
proofs underneath, thereby inundating the entire system. Rather, for Lakatos, 
mathematics is "quasi-empirical," using theories characterized by the upward trans- 
mission of falsity from "basic statements" to the axioms. 
Such a realistic, a posteriori assessment of mathematics provides a profound shift 
in methodology: 
The development of Euclidean theory consists of three stages: first the naive pre-scientific 
stage of trial and error which constitutes the prehistory of the subject; his is followed by the 
foundational period which reorganizes the discipline, trims the obscure borders, establishes 
the deductive structure of the safe kernel; all that is then left is the solution of problems inside 
the system, mainly proofs or disproofs of interesting conjectures . . . .  
The development of a quasi-empirical theory is very different. Itstarts with problems followed 
by daring solutions, then by severe tests, refutations. The vehicle of progress i bold speculations, 
criticism, controversy between rival theories, problemshifts. Attention is always focussed on 
the obscure borders. The slogans are growth and permanent revolution, ot foundations and 
accumulation f eternal truths. 
The main pattern of Euclidean criticism is suspicion: Do the proofs really prove? Are the 
methods used too strong and therefore fallible? The main pattern of quasi-empirical riticism 
is proliferation of theories and refutation. [Lakatos, Philosophical Papers. Vol. 2. pp. 29-30, 
cited by Koetsier on pp. 60-61]. 
These strident views demand development. The great merit of Koetsier's work is 
that it illuminates and builds upon the bountiful intellectual legacy left by Lakatos, 
offering a discussion in "the methodology of mathematics" (p. 1). Over 10 chapters, 
Koetsier examines methodological nd philosophical problems that equal "an essay 
in quasi-empiricism in every sense of the word" (p. 3). 
Koetsier begins in chapter one by examining Lakatos' "fallibility thesis"- - that  
fallibility is an essential characteristic of mathematics. Following Lakatos, Koetsier 
examines and rejects a strong fallibility thesis--that in principle a whole theory 
can be refuted. If this position were accepted, it would imply that the continuity 
of mathematics and the accumulation of truth would be accidental, at best. But 
there is an important, strong continuity to mathemat ics - -a  history that is interwoven 
and progressive. So Lakatos and Koetsier look elsewhere, uncovering important 
"heuristic approaches" or "patterns" in the historical development of mathematics 
that indicate a "weak fallibility" in mathematical knowledge-- in other words, that 
mathematical theories are fallible, yet not refutable in their totality. This makes 
the continuity of mathematics explainable, built on theories that are never totally 
wrong, but stand in need of refinement and shaping. 
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The second chapter is a look at falsification i mathematics, a search for potential 
falsifiers through the use of Lakatos' methodology of scientific research programmes 
(here the British spelling is used in the text). These falsifiers could only be products 
of the underlying mathematical theories used in constructing the paradigm--the 
research programmes or developing theories at play. Koetsier concludes that the 
refutation of a research programme is not a logical refutation, but a statement that 
another research programme is more competitive and can replace the original pro- 
gramme. 
While mathematics may be fallible, this does not suggest a purely scientific model. 
Mathematics does have its own contextual rationality. Chapters I I I-V are perhaps 
best described as "case studies" in an evaluation of mathematical rationality in 
terms of a methodology of scientific research programmes, touching on the work 
of Cauchy, Spalt, and Giorello, in that order. In each case we see evidence of a 
scientific programme, yet instructive differences that underline the unique program- 
matic development of mathematics. 
These case studies help to showcase mathematical methodology. Chapter VI 
follows with an attempt to define a "methodology of mathematical research tradi- 
tions" (p. 151), characterized byhistorically identifiable common general assump- 
tions about he mathematical entities tudied within a domain, and the assumptions 
about how to prove properties of those entities. By looking at various traditions 
in mathematics, Koetsier speculates about he proof theory relevant to each tradi- 
tion, and the factors influencing the weight of conjectures and theorems (see espe- 
cially pp. 170-1). 
Of compelling interest are the last four chapters. Chapter VII presents evidence to 
indicate a pre-Euclidean "Demonstrative Tradition" in mathematics, which would 
ground the subject in what we would now recognize as a more scientific methodol- 
ogy. Chapter VIII then jumps to the 18th century, outlining a"turn" from a formal- 
ist, nondeductive system to a conceptual, deductive approach in the 19th century. 
Chapter IX offers another case study, this time a look at the interchangeability 
theorem for partial differentiation, showing at least one example of how mathemati- 
cal research traditions change over time. Finally, in the last chapter, Koetsier pres- 
ents his conclusions, that mathematics is fallible, that this fallibility is "weak," 
and that aligning mathematics with a realist position "most naturally explains the 
development of mathematics" (p. 7). 
By way of evaluation, Koetsier undertakes an ambitious project. I am not sure that 
many mathematicians will feel comfortable with his suggestion that mathematical 
theories and methodologies are not a priori, and that mathematics has much in 
common with science. Understanding this, some may argue that Koetsier has not 
found enough similarity for concern, and in particular that his flirtation with Popper 
and Kuhn involves a dangerous misunderstanding of mathematics, science and the 
evolution of paradigms. But following Lakatos' lead, Koetsier attempts to prove 
that the imposing edifice of mathematics has less than solid structural support. It 
is no good arguing against either Lakatos or Koetsier by relying on a traditional, 
deductive picture of mathematics--that is the view challenged and the ground upon 
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which they wish to conduct his debate. Perhaps critics could argue that there is a 
difference between mathematical truth and the understanding of mathematics--that 
it is only our understanding of mathematical truths that is in need of refinement, 
not that mathematics i  "quasi-empirical." Surprisingly, the best refutation of La- 
katos and Koetsier may be from inside science itself, showing that Popper is shock- 
ingly mistaken, that science is really "risk analysis," that theories are never com- 
pletely falsified, or that some inductive vidence quals virtual certainty--traditional 
counterresponses designed to threaten Popper which may show that the falsifiability 
approach ultimately has little to do with mathematics. A traditional, realistic ap- 
proach to science may also damage the reliance by Lakatos and Koetsier on Kuhn 
and paradigm shifts. 
This is a well-written, clear, and easily comprehensible text, full of internal summa- 
ries and quite devoid of rigid technical language. While not a book for beginners, 
it has the singular advantages of simplicity and clarity, both highly relevant in 
producing ood argumentation. But two picky notes--first, here are a few misspell- 
ings that have escaped the editor and the author, a problem all too common in 
works targeted primarily at professional audiences, and, second, the text follows 
Webster's preferred "an historical" (for example, see p. 15). This makes the less 
preferable use of "a historical" in the title odd and inconsistent. Overall, I found 
the work to be thoughtful, very convincing, and a pleasure to read. I highly recom- 
mend this important book to anyone interested in the philosophy of mathematics, 
philosophical logic, and the history of mathematics. Koetsier is to be congratulated 
on a landmark contribution to the strangely sparse discussion of Lakatos' work 
and influence. 
Berkeley's Philosophy of Mathematics. By Douglas M. Jesseph. Chicago and 
London (The University of Chicago Press). 1993. xii + 322 pp. 
Reviewed by MARINA FRASCA-SPADA 
Newnham College, Cambridge CB3 9DF, England 
Jesseph's book naturally divides in two parts. The first is devoted to Berkeley's 
conception of geometry and arithmetic; its key is his rejection of abstract ideas and 
the theory that mathematical objects are abstracted from experience. It begins 
with a careful consideration of Berkeley's position against its background--in an 
extended sense, which goes from the role of abstraction i the philosophy of mathe- 
matics of the Aristotelian Scholastics, through the conceptions of such 17th-century 
mathematicians a  Barrow and Wallis, to the rejection of abstraction i the thought 
of Peter Browne, a teacher at Trinity College, Dublin, in the years when Berkeley 
was a student here. Having thus set the stage, the author proceeds to show the 
development ofBerkeley's philosophy of mathematics, from the initial stages, when 
he is concerned to refute abstractionism even at the price of rejecting classical 
geometry, to the reinterpretation f this latter in the Principles, to the final full 
